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Abstract. We conduct a systematic study on the light-client protocol
of permissionless blockchains, in the setting where full nodes and light
clients are rational. In the game-theoretic model, we design a superlight-
client protocol to enable a light client to employ some relaying full nodes
(e.g. two or one) to read the blockchain. The protocol is “generic”, i.e., it
can be deployed disregarding underlying consensuses, and it is also “su-
perlight”, i.e., the computational cost of the light client to predicate the
(non)existence of a transaction in the blockchain becomes a small con-
stant. Since our protocol resolves a fundamental challenge of broadening
the usage of blockchain technology, it captures a wide variety of impor-
tant use-cases such as multi-chain wallets, DApp browsers and more.
Keywords: Blockchain · Light client · Game-theoretic security.
1 Introduction
The blockchain [63,16] can be considered as an abstracted global ledger [30,52,10],
which can be read and written by the users of higher level applications [16,69,24,25].
However, the basic abstraction of reading the ledger1 implicitly requires the user
maintain a personal full node [13,38] to keep a local blockchain replica. Neverthe-
less, with the rapid popularity of blockchain, an increasing number of blockchain
users become merely caring about the high-level applications such as cryptocur-
rency, instead of maintaining any full node [41]; let alone, many of them are
resource-starved, say browser extensions and smartphones [72,20,73,70], that
have too limited resources to stay on-line to maintain a full node.
Thus an urgent demand of blockchain’s light clients, a.k.a., superlight clients
or lightweight clients [15,50,47,17], rises up. Consider a quintessential scenario:
Alice is the cashier of a pizza store; a customer Bob tells her B1,000 has been
paid for some pizzas, via a bitcoin transaction with txid 0xa1075d..., and claims
the transaction is already in the blockchain; then Alice needs to check that, by
activating a lite wallet app installed in her mobile phone. That is to say, Alice,
and many typical blockchain users, need a superlight client, which can stay off-
line to opt out of the consensus, and can still wake up any time to “read” the
blockchain with high-security assurance and low computational cost.
1 Writing in the blockchain is trivial, as one can gossip with some full nodes to diffuse
its messages to the entire blockchain network (a.k.a. network diffuse functionality
[30,7]). Then the blockchain’s liveness ensures the inclusion of the messages [30].
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1.1 Insufficiencies of existing practices
The fundamental challenge of designing the superlight client stems from a fact:
the records in the blockchain are “authenticated” by the latest chain agreed
across the blockchain network (a.k.a., the main-chain) [66,63,21,37,48]. So with-
out a trusted replica of the main-chain at hand, the light client has to rely on
some other full nodes to forward the records in the blockchain. The light-client
protocol therefore must be carefully designed to deal with the probably distrust-
ful full nodes that can forward fake blockchain readings to the client.
Some ad-hoc attempts. A few proposals attempt to prevent the client being
cheated, by relying on heavyweight assumptions. For example, a few proposals
[27,21] assume a diverse list of known full nodes to serve as relays. The list is
supposed to consist of some “mining” pools and/or a few so-called blockchain
“explorers”, such that the client can count on the honest-majority of these known
relays to read the chain. But for many real-world permissionless blockchains, this
assumption is too heavy to hold with high-confidence. Say Cardano [1], a top-
10 blockchain by market capitalization, has quite few “explorer” websites on
the run; even worse, the naive idea of recruiting “mining” pools as relays is
more elusive, considering most of them would not participate without moderate
incentives [41]. So it is unclear how to identify an honest-majority set of known
relays for each blockchain. As such, these ad-hoc solutions become unreliable,
considering their heavyweight assumptions are seemingly elusive in practice.
Cryptographic approaches. To design the light-client protocol against mali-
cious relay full nodes, a few cryptographic approaches are proposed [15,47,63,76].
Naive use of SPV is problematic. The most straightforward way to instanti-
ating the idea is to let the client keep track of the suffix of the main-chain, and
then check the existence of transactions by verifying SPV proofs [63], but the
naive approach causes at least one major issue: the client has to frequently be
on-line to track the growth of main-chain. Otherwise, when the client wakes up
from a deep sleep, it needs to at least verify the block headers of the main-chain
linearly. Such the bootstrapping can be costly, considering the main-chain is
ever-growing, say the headers of Ethereum is growing at a pace of ∼ 1 GB per
year. In many critical use-cases such as web browsers and/or mobile phones, the
idea of straightly using SPV proofs becomes rather unrealistic.
PoW-specific results. For PoW chains, some existing superlight clients such
as FlyClient and NiPoPoW [15,47] circumvent the problem of SPV proofs. These
ideas notice the main-chain is essentially “authenticated” by its few suffix blocks,
and then develop some PoW-specific techniques to allow the suffix blocks be
proven to a client at only sublinear cost. But they come with one major limit,
namely, need to verify PoWs to discover the correct suffix, and therefore cannot
fit the promising class of proof-of-stake (PoS) consensuses [48,21,37].
Superlight client for PoS still unclear. For PoS chains, it is yet unclear how
to realize an actual superlight client that can go off-line to completely opt out
of consensus. The major issue is lacking an efficient way to proving the suf-
fix of PoS chains to an off-line client, as the validity of the suffix blocks relies
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on the signatures of stakeholders, whose validities further depend on the re-
cent stake distributions, which further are authenticated by the blockchain itself
[37,21,48,17]. Some recent efforts [31,59,54] allow the always-online clients to use
minimal space to track the suffix of PoS chains, without maintaining the stake
distributions. But for the major challenge of enabling the clients to go off-line,
there only exist few fast-bootstrapping proposals for full nodes [56,9], which still
require the client to download and verify a linear portion of the PoS chain to
respawn, thus incurring substantial cost [37,22].
Demands of “consensus-oblivious” light client. Most existing light-client
protocols are highly specialized for concrete consensuses (e.g. PoW). This not
only prevents us adapting them to instantiate actual superlight clients for the
PoS chains, but also hinders their easy deployment and user experience in many
important use-cases in reality. A typical scenario is a multi-chain wallet, which is
expected to support various cryptocurrencies atop different chains, each of which
is even running a distinct consensus. Bearing that existing light-client protocols
are highly specialized [31,59,54,15,47], the multi-chain wallet needs to instantiate
different protocols for distinct consensuses. That said, without a generic solution,
the multi-chain wallet ends up to contain many independent “sub-wallets”. Such
the multi-chain wallet not only is burdensome for the users, but also challenges
the developers to correctly implement all sub-wallets. In contrast, if there is a
generic protocol fitting all, one can simply tune some parameters at best.
Explore a generic solution in a different setting. The cryptographic setting
seems to be an inherent obstacle-ridden path to the generic light-client protocol.
Recall it usually needs to prove the main-chain’s suffix validated by the consensus
rules [31,54,15,47]. Even if one puts forth a “consensus-oblivious” solution in
the cryptographic setting, it likely has to convert all “proofs” for suffix into a
generic statement of verifiable computation (VC) [59], which is unclear how to be
realized practically, considering VC itself is not fully practical yet for complicated
statements (see Appendix F for a thorough review on the pertinent topics).
To meet the urgent demand of the generic light-client protocol, we explicitly
deviate from the cryptographic setting, and focus on the light-client problem
due to the game-theoretic approach, in light of many successful studies such as
rational multi-party computation [5,40,42,39,46,11,51,29] and rational verifiable
computation [24,71,67,53]. In the rational setting, we can hope a consensus-
independent incentive mechanism exists to assist a simple light-client protocol,
such that all rational protocol participants (i.e. the full nodes and the light client)
would follow the protocol design; as a result, the client can efficiently retrieve
the correct information about the blockchain, and the full nodes are fairly paid.
Following that, this paper would present: a systematic treatment to the light-
client problem of permissionless blockchains in the game-theoretic setting.
1.2 Our results
By reconsidering the light-client problem through the powerful lens of the game-
theoretic setting, we design a superlight protocol to enable a client to recruit
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several full nodes (e.g. one or two) to securely evaluate a general class of predi-
cates about the blockchain.
Contributions. To summarize, our technical contributions are three-fold:
• Our light-client protocol can be bootstrapped in the rational setting, effi-
ciently and generically. First, the protocol is superlight, in the sense that
the client can go off-line and wake up any time to evaluate a general class
of chain predicates at a tiny constant computationally cost; as long as the
truthness or falseness of these chain predicates is reducible to few transac-
tions’ inclusion in the blockchain. Moreover, our generic protocol gets rid of
the dependency on consensuses and can be deployed in nearly any permis-
sionless blockchain (e.g., Turing-complete blockchains [16,75]) without even
velvet forks [78], thus supporting the promising PoS type of consensuses.
• Along the way, we conduct a systematic study to understand whether, or to
what extent, our protocol for the superlight client is secure, in the rational
setting (where is no always available trusted third-parties). We make non-
trivial analyses of the incomplete-information extensive game induced by our
light-client protocol, and conduct a comprehensive study to understand how
to finely tune the incentives to achieve security in different scenarios, from
the standard setting of non-cooperative full nodes to the pessimistic setting
of colluding full nodes.
• Our protocol allows the rational client to evaluate (non)existence of a given
transaction. As such, a rational light client can be convinced by rational full
nodes that a given transaction is not in any block of the entire chain, which
provides a simple way to performing non-existence “proof”. In contrast, to
our knowledge, relevant studies in the cryptographic setting either give up
non-existence proof [63,50], or require to heavily modify the data structure
of the current blockchains [14,62].
Solution in a nutshell. Assuming the light client and relay nodes are rational,
we leverage the smart contract to facilitate a simple and useful incentive mecha-
nism, such that being honest becomes their best choice, namely, for the highest
utilities, (i) the relay nodes must forward the blockchain’s records correctly, and
(ii) the client must pay the relays honestly. From high-level, the ideas are:
• Setup. The light client and relay node(s) place their initial deposits in an
“arbiter” smart contract, such that a carefully designed incentive mechanism
later can leverage these deposits to facilitate rewards/punishments to deter
deviations from the light-client protocol.
• Repeated queries. After setup, the client can repeatedly query the relays to
forward blockchain readings (up to k times). Each query proceeds as:
1. Request. The client firstly specifies the details of the predicate to query
in the arbiter contract, which can be done since writing in the contract
is trivial for the network diffuse functionality.1
2. Response. Once the relays see the specifications of the chain predicate in
the arbiter contract, they are incentivized to evaluate the predicate and
forward the ground truth to the client off-chain.
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3. Feedback. Then the client decides an output, according to what it receives
from the relays. Besides, the client shall report what it receives to the
arbiter contract; otherwise, gets a fine.
4. Payout. Finally, the contract verifies whether the relays are honest, ac-
cording to the feedback from the client, and then facilitates an incentive
mechanism to reward (or punish) the relays.
Without a proper incentive mechanism, the above simple protocol is insecure
to any extent as it is. So carefully designed incentives must be added to ensure
“following the protocol” to be a desired equilibrium, namely, all rational
parties, including the relays and the client, would not deviate.
Challenges & techniques. Though instantiating the above idea seems simple,
it on the contrary is challenged by the limit of the “handicapped” arbiter con-
tract. In particular, it is unclear how to implement the contract in practice to
directly verify the non-existence of transactions, though it is easy to let it ver-
ify any transaction’s existence if being given the corresponding inclusion proof
[8,50]. Thus, for a chain predicate whose trueness/falseness is reducible to the
existence/nonexistence of some transactions, the contract can at most verify ei-
ther its trueness or its falseness. In other words, considering the chain predicate
as a binary True or False question, there exists a proof verifiable by the arbiter
contract to attest it is True (or it is False), but not both. This enables the
relays to adopt a malicious strategy: “always forward unprovable bogus disre-
garding the actual ground truth”, because doing so would not be caught by the
contract, and thus the relays are still paid. The challenge therefore becomes how
to design an incentive mechanism to deter the relays from flooding unverifiable
bogus claims, given only the “handicapped” verifiability of the contract.
To circumvent the limit of the arbiter contract, we squeeze the most of its
“handicapped” verifiability to finely tune the incentive mechanism, such that
“flooding fake unverifiable claims” become irrational. Following that, any de-
viations from the protocol are further deterred, from the standard setting of
non-cooperative relays to the extremely hostile case of colluding relays:
• If two non-cooperative relays (e.g., two competing mining pools in practice)
can be identified and recruited, we leverage the natural tension between these
two selfish relays to “audit” each other. As such, fooling the client is deterred,
because a selfish relay is incentivized to report the other’s (unverifiable)
bogus claim, by producing a proof attesting the opposite of the fake claim.
• In the extremely adversarial scenario where any two recruited relays can form
a coalition, the setting becomes rather pessimistic, as the client is essentially
requesting an unknown knowledge from a single party. Nevertheless, the
incentive can still be slightly tuned to function as follows:
1. The first tuning does not rely on any extra assumption. The adjustment
is to let the arbiter contract assign a higher payoff to a proved claim while
make a lower payoff to an unprovable claim. So the best strategy of the
only relay is to forward the actual ground truth, as long as the malicious
benefit attained by fooling the client is smaller than the maximal reward
promised by the client.
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Though this result has limited applicabilities, for example, cannot handle
valuable queries, it still captures a variety of meaningful real-world use-
cases, in particular, many DApp browsers, where the relay is not rather
interested in cheating the client.
2. The second adjustment relies on another moderate rationality assump-
tion, that is: at least one selfish public full node (in the entire blockchain
network) can keep on monitoring the internal states of the arbiter con-
tract at a negligible cost and will not cooperate with the recruited relay.
Thus whenever the recruited relay makes an unprovable bogus claim, our
design incentivizes the selfish public full node to “audit” by proving the
opposite side is the actual ground truth, which deters the recruited relay
from flooding unprovable bogus.
Application scenarios. Our protocol supports a wide variety of applications,
as it solves a fundamental issue preventing low-capacity users using blockchain:
• Decentralized application browser. The DApp browser is a natural application
scenario. For example, a lightweight browser for CryptoKitties [20] can get
rid of a trusted Web server. When surfing the DApp via a distrustful Web
server, the users need to verify whether the content rendered by the server
is correct, which can be done through our light-client protocol efficiently.
• Mobile wallet for multiple cryptocurrencies. Our protocol can be leveraged to
implement a super-light mobile wallet to verify the (non)existence of cryp-
tocurrency transactions. In particular, it can keep track of multiple coins
atop different blockchains running over diverse types of consensuses.
2 Warm-up: game-theoretic security
Usually, the game-theoretic analysis of an interactive protocol starts by defining
an extensive game [44,24,65] to model the strategies (i.e., probabilistic inter-
active Turing machines) of each party in the protocol. Then a utility function
would assign every party a certain payoff, for each possible execution induced
by the strategies of all parties. So the security of the protocol can be argued
by the properties of the game, for example, its Nash equilibrium [42] or other
stronger equilibrium notions [43,44,24,65,51]. Here we introduce a simple inter-
active “protocol” to exemplify the idea of conducting analysis in game-theoretic
model, while deferring the extensive preliminary definitions to Appendix B.
2.1 An interactive protocol as an extensive-form game
Consider an oversimplified “light-client protocol”: Alice is a cashier of a pizza
store; her client asks a full node (i.e. relay) to check a transaction’s (non)existence,
and simply terminates to output what is forwarded by the relay.
Strategy, action, history, and information set. Let the oversimplified “pro-
tocol” proceed in synchronous round. In each round, the parties will execute its
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strategy, i.e., a probabilistic polynomial-time ITM in our context, to produce
and feed a string to the protocol, a.k.a., take an action. During the course of
the protocol, a sequence of actions would be made, and we say it is a history by
convention of the game theory literature; moreover, when a party acts, it might
have learned some (incomplete) information from earlier actions taken by other
parties, so the notion of information sets are introduced to characterize what has
and has not been learned by each party (see Appendix B for the deferred formal
definitions). Concretely speaking, the oversimplified “light-client protocol” can
be described by the extensive-form game as shown in Fig 1:
1. Round 1 (chance acts). A definitional virtual party called chance sets the
ground truth, namely, it determines True or False to represent whether the
transaction exists (denoted by a or a′ respectively). To capture the uncer-
tainty of the ground truth, the chance acts arbitrarily.
2. Round 2 (relay acts). Then, the relay is activated to forward True or False
to the light client, which states whether the transaction exists or not. Note
the strategy chosen by the relay is an ITM that can produce arbitrary strings
in this round, we need to map the strings into the admissible actions, namely,
t, f and x. For definiteness, we let the string of ground truth be interpreted
as the action t, the string of the opposite of ground truth be interpreted as
the action f , and all other strings (including abort) be interpreted as x.
3. Round 3 (client acts). Finally, the client outputs True (denoted by A) or
False (denoted by A′) to represent whether the transaction exists or not,
according to the (incomplete) information acquired from the protocol. Note
the client knows how the relay acts, but cannot directly infer the action
of chance. So it faces three distinct information sets I1, I2 and I3, which
respectively represent the client receives True, False and others in Round
2. The client cannot distinguish the histories inside each information set.
relay
x
client
chance
x
a a'
t
f
t
f
A A' A A' A A' A A' A A' A A'
:
uclient
urelay
0
0
-v
αv
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-v
βv
-v
αv
-v
βv
-v
αv
-v
βv
I1 I2I3
Fig. 1. The extensive game of an oversimplified light-client “protocol”. The utility
function is an example to clarify the insecurity of such a trivial idea.
Utility function. After the protocol terminates, its game reaches a so-called
terminal history. A well-defined utility function specifies the economic outcome
of each party, for each terminal history induced by the extensive game.
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In practice, the utility function is determined by some economic factors of
the parties and the protocol itself [42,24]. For example, the rationale behind the
utility function in Fig 1 can be understood as: (i) the relay is motivated to fool
the client to believe the nonexistence of an existing transaction, because this
literally “censors” Alice to harm her business by a loss of $v, which also brings a
malicious benefit $α ·v to the relay; (ii) the relay also prefers to fool the client to
believe the existence of a non-existing transaction, so the relay gets free pizzas
valued by $β · v, which causes Alice lose $v (i.e., the amount supposed to be
transacted to purchase pizzas), (iii) after all, the oversimplified protocol itself
does not facilitate any punishment/reward, so will not affect the utility function.
2.2 Security via equilibrium
Putting the game structure and the utility function together, we can argue
the (in)security due to the equilibria in the game. In particular, we can adopt
the strong notion of sequential equilibrium for extensive games [43,44,24,65] to
demonstrate that the rational parties would not deviate, at each stage during the
execution of the protocol. As a negative lesson, the oversimplified “light-client
game” in Fig 2 is insecure in the game-theoretic setting, as the relay can unilat-
erally deviate to fool the client for higher utility. In contrast, if the protocol is
secure in game-theoretic settings, its game shall realize desired equilibrium, such
that rational parties would not diverge from the protocol for highest utilities.
3 Preliminary
Blockchain addressing. A blockchain (e.g., denoted by C) is a chain of block
(headers). Each block commits a list of payload (e.g., transactions). Notation-
wise, we use Python bracket C[t] to address the block (header) at the height t of
the chain C. For example, C[0] represents the genesis block, and C[0 : N ] repre-
sents a chain consisting of N blocks (where C[0] is known as genesis). W.l.o.g.,
a block C[t] is defined as a tuple of (ht−1, nonce, root), where ht−1 is the hash of
the block C[t−1], nonce is the valid PoX (e.g., the correct preimage in PoW, and
the valid signatures in PoS), and root is Merkle tree root of payload. Through
the paper, C[t].root denotes Merkle root of block C[t].
Payload & Merkle tree. Let TXt := 〈tx1, tx2, · · · , txn〉 denote a sequence
of transactions that is the payload of the block C[t]. Recall TXt is included
by the block C[t] through Merkle tree [63,75], which is an authenticated data
structure scheme of three algorithms (BuildMT,GenMTP,VrfyMTP). BuildMT
inputs TXt = 〈tx1, · · · , txn〉 and outputs a Merkle tree MT with root. GenMTP
takes the tree MT (built for TXt) and a transaction tx ∈ TXt as input, and
outputs a proof pij for the inclusion of tx in TXt at the position j. VrfyMTP inputs
pij , root and tx and outputs either 1 or 0. The Merkle tree scheme satisfies: (i)
Correctness. Pr[VrfyMTP(MT.root, tx, pii) = 1 | pii ← GenMTP(MT, tx), MT ←
BuildMT(TX)] = 1; (ii) Security. for ∀ P.P.T. A, Pr[VrfyMTP(MT.root, tx, pii) =
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1 ∧ tx 6= TX[i] | pii ← A(1λ,MT, tx), MT ← BuildMT(TX) ] ≤ negl(λ). The
detailed construction of the Merkle tree scheme is deferred to Appendix A.
Smart contract. Essentially, a smart contract [16,75] can be abstracted as an
ideal functionality with a global ledger subroutine, so it can faithfully instruct
the ledger to freeze “coins” as deposits and then correctly facilitate conditional
payments [52,49,10]. This paper explicitly adopts the widely-used notations in-
vented by Kosba et al. [52] to describe the smart contract, for example:
• The contract can access the global time T , which can be seen as an equivalent
notion of the height of the latest blockchain.
• The contract can access a global dictionary ledger for conditional payments.
• We slightly enhance their notations to allow the contract to access a global
dictionary blockhashes. Each item blockhashes[t] is the hash of the block C[t].2
• The contract would not send its internal states to the light client, which cap-
tures the client opts out of consensus. However, the client can send messages
to the contract, due to the well abstracted network diffusion functionality.
In addition, we emphasize that the blockchain can be seen as a global ledger
functionality [10,49] that allows all full nodes to maintain their local blockchain
replicas consistent to the global dictionary blockhashes (within a clock period).
4 Problem Formulation
The light-client protocol involves a light client, some relay full nodes (e.g. one or
two), and an ideal functionality (i.e. “arbiter” contract). The light client relies on
the relays to “read” the chain, and the relays expect to receive correct payments.
4.1 Formalizing readings from the blockchain
The basic functionality of our light-client protocol is to allow the resource-starved
clients to evaluate the falseness or trueness about some statements over the
blockchain [47]. This aim is subtly broader than [50], whose goal is restricted to
prevent the client from deciding trueness when the statement is actually false.
Chain predicate. The paper focuses on a general class of chain predicates whose
trueness (or falseness) can be induced by up to l transactions’ inclusions in the
chain, such as “whether the transaction with identifier txid is in the blockchain
C[0 : N ] or not”. Formally, we focus on the chain predicate in the form of:
P`(C[0 : N ]) =
{
False, otherwise
True, ∃C′ ⊂ C[0 : N ] s.t. D`(C′) = True
2 Remark that the above modeling requires the block hashes can be read by smart
contracts from the blockchain’s internal states (e.g. available global variables) [28]. In
Ethereum, this currently can be realized via the proposal of Andrew Miller [60] and
will be incorporated due to the already-planned Ethereum enhancement EIP-210 [3].
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or equivalently, there is Q(·) = ¬P(·):
Q`(C[0 : N ]) =
{
False, ∃C′ ⊂ C[0 : N ] s.t. D`(C′) = True
True, otherwise
where C′ is a subset of the blockchain C[0 : N ], and D`(·) is a computable
predicate taking C′ as input and is writable as:
D`(C′) =

True, ∃ {txi} that |{txi}| ≤ `:
f({txi}) = 1 ∧ ∀ txi ∈ {txi},
∃ C[t] ∈ C′ and P.P.T. computable pii s.t.
VrfyMTP(C[t].root,H(txi), pii) = 1
False, otherwise
where f({txi}) = 1 captures that {txi} satisfies a certain relationship, e.g., “the
hash of each txi equals a specified identifier txidi”, or “each txi can pass the
membership test of a given bloom filter”, or “the overall inflow of {txi} is greater
than a given value”. We let P`N and Q
`
N be short for P
`(C[0 : N ]) and Q`(C[0 :
N ]), respectively.
Examples of chain predicate. The seemingly complicated definition of chain
predicate actually has rather straightforward intuition to capture a wide range
of blockchain “readings”, as for any predicate under this category, either its true-
ness or its falseness can be succinctly attested by up to ` transactions’ inclusion
in the chain. For ` = 1, some concrete examples are:
• “A certain transaction tx is included in C[0 : N ]”, the trueness which can be
attested by tx’s inclusion in the chain.
• “A set of transactions {txj} are all incoming transactions sent to a particular
address in C[0 : N ]”, the falseness of which can be proven, if ∃ a transaction
tx s.t.: (i) tx /∈ {txj}, (ii) tx is sent to the certain address, and (iii) tx is
included in the chain C[0 : N ].
Limits. A chain predicate is a binary question, whose trueness (or falseness) is
reducible to the inclusion of some transactions. Nevertheless, its actual mean-
ing depends on how to concretely specify it. Intuitively, a “meaningful” chain
predicate might need certain specifications from an external party outside the
system. For example, the cashier of a pizza store can specify a transaction to
evaluate its (non)existence, only if the customer tells the txid.
“Handicapped” verifiability. W.lo.g., we will focus on the chain predicate in
form of P`N , namely, whose trueness is provable instead of the falseness for pre-
sentation simplicity. Such the “handicapped” verifiability can be well abstracted
through a tuple of two algorithms (evaluate, validateTrue):
• evaluate(P`N )→ σ or ⊥: The algorithm takes the replica of the blockchain as
auxiliary input and outputs σ or ⊥, where σ is a proof for P`N = True, and ⊥
represents its falseness; note the proof σ here includes: a set of transactions
{txi}, a set of Merkle proofs {pii}, and a set of blocks C′;
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• validateTrue(σ,P`N ) → 0 or 1: This algorithm takes blockhashes as auxil-
iary input and outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject) depending on whether σ is
deemed to be a valid proof for P`N = True; note the validation parses σ as
({txi}, {pii},C′) and verifies: (i) C′ is included by blockhashes[t] where t ≤ N ;
(ii) each txi is committed by a block in C
′ due to Merkle proof pii; (iii)
f({txi}) = 1 where f(·) is the specification of the chain predicate.
evaluate validateTrue
blockchain replica hashes of blocks
true : σ
false : ⊥ 0/1
P `N
The above algorithms satisfy: (i) Correctness. For any chain predicate P`N ,
there is Pr[validateTrue(evaluate(P`N ), P
`
N ) = 1 | P`N = true] = 1, and (ii)
Verifiability. for any P.P.T. A and P`N , there is Pr[validateTrue(σ ← A(P`),
P`N ) = 1 | P`N = false] ≤ negl(λ), where evaluate implicitly takes the blockchain
replica as input, and validateTrue implicitly inputs blockhashes. The abstraction
can also be slightly adapted for Q`N whose falseness is the provable side, though
we omit that for presentation simplicity. Through the remaining of the paper,
evaluate can be seen as a black-box callable by any full nodes that have the
complete replica of the blockchain, and validateTrue is a subroutine that can be
invoked by the smart contracts that can access the dictionary blockhashes.
4.2 System & adversary model
The system explicitly consists of a light client, some relay(s) and an arbiter con-
tract. All of them are computationally bounded to perform only polynomial-time
computations. The messages between them can deliver synchronously within a-
priori known delay ∆T , via point-to-point channels. In details,
The rational lightweight client LW is abstracted as:
• It is rational and selfish;
• It is computationally bounded, i.e., it can only take an action computable
in probabilistic polynomial-time;
• It opts out of consensus; to capture this, we assume:
– The client can send messages to the contract due to the network diffusion
functionality [30,52];
– The client cannot receive messages from the contract except a short
setup phase, which can be done in practice because the client user can
temporarily boost a personal full node by fast-bootstrapping protocols.
The rational full node Ri is modeled as:
• It is rational. Also, the full node Ri might (or might not) cooperate with
another full node Rj . The (non)-cooperation of them is specified as:
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– The cooperative full nodes form a coalition to maximize the total util-
ity, as they can share all information, coordinate all actions and transfer
payoffs, etc. [64]; essentially, we follow the conventional notion to view
the cooperative relays as a single party [11].
– Non-cooperative full nodes maximize their own utilities independently
in a selfish manner due to the standard non-cooperative game theory,
which can be understood as that they are not allowed to choose some
ITMs to communicate with each other [55];
• It can only take P.P.T. computable actions at any stage of the protocol;
• The full node runs the consensus, such that:
– It stores the complete replica of the latest blockchain;
– It can send/receive messages to/from the smart contract;
• It can send messages to the light client via an off-chain private channel.3
The arbiter contract Gac follows the standard abstraction of smart con-
tracts [52,49], with a few slight extensions. First, it would not send any messages
to the light client except during a short setup phase. Second, it can access a dic-
tionary blockhashes [60,3], which contains the hashes of all blocks. The latter
abstraction allows the contract to invoke validateTrue to verify the proof attest-
ing the trueness of any predicate P`N , in case the predicate is actually true.
4.3 Economic factors of our model
It is necessary to clarify the economic parameters of the rational parties to
complete our game-theoretic model. We present those economic factors and argue
the rationale behind them as follows:
• c: It represents how much the client spends to maintain its (personal) trusted
full node. Note c does not mean the security relies on a trusted full node and
only characterizes the cost of maintaining the trusted full node. For example,
c→∞ would represent that no available trusted full node. Note c does not
characterize the cost of relay to maintain a relaying full node.
• v: The factor means the “value” attached to the chain predicate under query.
If the client incorrectly evaluates the predicate, it loses v. For example, the
cashier Alice is evaluating the (non)existence of a certain transaction; if Alice
believes the existence of a non-existing transaction, she loses the amount to
be transacted; if Alice believes the nonexistence of an existing transaction,
her business is harmed by such the censorship.
• vi(P`N ,C) → [0, vi]: This function characterizes the motivation of the relay
Ri to cheat the light client. Namely, it represents the extra (malicious) utility
that the relay Ri earns, if fooling the client to incorrectly evaluate the chain
predicate. We explicitly let vi(P
`
N ,C) have an upper-bound vi.
3 Such the assumption can be granted if considering the client and the relays can
set up private communication channels on demand. In practice, this can be done
because (i) the client can “broadcast” its network address via the blockchain [57], or
(ii) there is a trusted name service that tracks the network addresses of the relays.
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• : When a party chooses a strategy (i.e., a P.P.T. ITM) to break underlying
cryptosystems, we let  represent the expected utility of such a strategy,
where  is a negligible function in cryptographic security parameter [23].
• In addition, all communications and P.P.T. computations can be done cost-
lessly (unless otherwise specified).
4.4 Security goal
The aim of the light-client protocol in the game-theoretic model is to allow
a rational light client employ some rational relaying full nodes (e.g., two) to
correctly evaluate a few chain predicates, and these recruited full nodes are
correctly paid as pre-specified. In details, we require such the light-client protocol
ΠLW to satisfy the following correctness and security properties:
• Correctness. If all parties are honest, we require: (i) the relay nodes are
correctly paid; (ii) the light client correctly evaluates some chain predicates
under the category of P`(·), regarding the chain C[0 : T ] (i.e. the chain at
the time of evaluating). Both requirements shall hold with probability 1.
• Security. We adopt a strong game-theoretic security notion of sequential
equilibrium [44,24,43] for incomplete-information extensive games. Consider
an extensive-form game Γ that models the light-client protocol ΠLW , and let
(Zbad,Zgood) as a partition of the terminal histories Z of the game Γ . Given
a -sequential equilibrium of Γ denoted by σ, the probability of reaching each
terminal history z ∈ Z can be induced, which can be denoted by ρ(σ, z). Our
security goal would require: for any -sequential equilibrium σ of Γ , under
which the game Γ terminates in Zgood with overwhelming probability.
Remark. The traditional game-theory analysis captures only computationally
unbounded players. But it becomes natural to consider computationally-bounded
players in an interactive protocol using cryptography, so will we do through the
paper. In such the setting, a strategy of a party can be a P.P.T. ITM to break the
underlying cryptosystems. However, this strategy succeeds with only negligible
probability. Consequently, our security goal (i.e. -sequential equilibrium with
at most negligible ) can be refined into a computational variant to state the
rational players switch strategies, only if the gain of deviation is non-negligible.
5 A simple light-client protocol
We carefully design a simple light-client protocol, in which a light client (LW)
can leverage it to employ two (or one) relays to evaluate the chain predicates
P`N (as defined in Section 4.1).
5.1 Arbiter contract & high-level of the protocol
The simple light-client protocol is centering around an arbiter smart contract
Gac as shown in Fig 2. It begins with letting all parties place their initial de-
posits in the arbiter contract Gac. Later, the client can ask the relays to forward
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some readings about the blockchain, and then feeds what it receives back to
the contract. As such, once the contract hears the feedback from the client, it
can leverage the initial deposits to facilitate some proper incentive mechanism,
in order to prevent the parties from deviating by rewards and/or punishments,
which becomes the crux of our protocol.
For security in the rational setting, the incentive mechanism must be pow-
erful enough to precisely punish misbehaviors (and reward honesty). Our main
principle to realize such the powerful incentive is letting the arbiter contract
to learn as much as possible regarding how the protocol is actually executed
off-chain, so it can precisely punish and then deter any deviations.
Nevertheless, the contract has “handicapped” abilities. So we have to care-
fully design the protocol to circumvent its limits, for the convenience of designing
the powerful enough incentive mechanism later.
The arbiter contract Gac for m relays (m = 1 or 2)
Init. Let state := INIT, deposits := {}, relays := {}, pubKeys := {}, ctr := 0,
predicate := ∅, predicate.N := 0, Tend := 0
Setup phase
Create. Upon receiving (create, k, p, e, dL, dF , ∆T ) from LW:
assert state = INIT and ledger[LW] ≥ $k · dL
store k, p, e, r, dL, dF , and ∆T as internal states
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW]− $k · dL
ctr := k and state := CREATED
send (deployed, k, p, e, dL, dF , ∆T ) to all
Join. Upon receiving (join, pki) from Ri for first time:
assert state = CREATED and ledger[Ri] ≥ $k · dF
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri]− $k · dF
pubKeys := pubKeys ∪ (Ri, pki)
state := READY, if |pubKeys| = m
Queries phase
Request. Upon receiving (request,P`) from LW:
assert state = READY and ledger[LW] ≥ $(p+ e)
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW]− $(p+ e)
predicate := P`T //Note T is the current chain height
Tend := T +∆T
send (quering, ctr, predicate) to all full nodes
state := QUERYING
Feedback. Upon receiving (feedback, responses) from LW for first time:
assert state = QUERYING
store responses for the current ctr
Timer. Upon T ≥ Tend and state := QUERYING:
call Incentive(responses, predicate) subroutine
let ctr := ctr − 1
if ctr > 0 then state := READY
else state := EXPIRED
Fig. 2. The contract Gac by pseudocode notations in [52]. The Incentive subroutine is
decoupled from the protocol and will be presented separately in the later section.
First, the contract Gac does not know what the relay nodes forward to the
light client off-chain. So the contract Gac has to rely on the client to know
what the relays did. At the first glance, the client might cheat the contract,
by claiming that it receives nothing from the relays or even forging the relays’
messages, in order to avoid paying. To deal with the issue, we require that: (i) the
relays authenticate what they forward to the client by digital signatures, so the
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contract later can verify whether a message was originally sent from the relays,
by checking the attached signatures; (ii) the contract requires the light client to
deposit an amount of $e for each query, which is returned to the client, only if
the client reports some forwarded blockchain readings signed by the relays.
Second, the contract has a “handicapped” verifiability, which allows it to effi-
ciently verify a claim of P`N = True, if being give a succinct proof σ. To leverage
the property, the protocol is designed to let the relays attach the corresponding
proof σ whenever claiming the provable trueness. Again, such the design is a
simple yet still useful way to allow the contract “learn” more about the proto-
col execution, which later allows us to design powerful incentive mechanisms to
precisely punish deviations.
5.2 The light-client protocol
In the presence of the contract Gac, our light-client protocol can be formally
described as Fig 3. To make an oversimplified summary, it first comes with a
one-time setup phase, during which the relay(s) and client make initial deposits,
which later can be leveraged by the incentive mechanism to fine tune the payoffs.
Then, the client can work independently and request the relays to evaluate a few
chain predicates up to k times, repeatedly. Since the payoffs are well adjusted,
“following the protocol” becomes the rational choice of everyone in each query.
The light-client protocol ΠLW (where are m relays)
Setup phase
• Protocol for the light client LW:
Create. Upon instantiating a protocol instance:
decide k, p, e, dL, dF , ∆T and let ctrlw := k
send (create, k, p, e, dL, dF , ∆T ) to Gac
Disconnect. Upon receiving (initialized, pubKeys) from Gac:
record pubKeys, and disconnect the trusted full node
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Protocol for the relay Ri:
Join. Upon receiving (deployed, k, p, e, dL, dF , ∆T ) from Gac:
generate a key pair (ski, pki) for signature scheme
send (join, pki) to Gac
Queries phase
• Protocol for the light client LW:
Request. Upon receiving a message (from the higher level app) to
evaluate the predicate P`:
Tfeed := T + 2∆T , and send (request,P
`) to Gac
Evaluate. Upon receiving (response, ctri, resulti, sigi) from Ri:
assert T ≤ Tfeed and ctri = ctrlw
assert vrfySig(〈resulti, ctr〉, sigi, pki) = 1
responses := responses ∪ (resulti, sigi)
if |responses| = m then
output b ∈ {True, False}, if responses claim b
Feedback. Upon T = Tfeed:
ctrlw := ctrlw − 1, send (feedback, responses) to Gac. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Protocol for the relay Ri:
Respond. Upon receiving (quering, ctr,P`N ) from Gac:
resulti := evaluate(P
`
N )
sigi := sign(〈resulti, ctr〉, ski)
send (response, ctr, resulti, sigi) to LW
Fig. 3. The protocol ΠLW among honest relay node(s) and the light client.
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Setup phase. As shown in Fig 3, the user of a lightweight client LW connects
to a trusted full node in the setup phase, and announces an “arbiter” smart
contract Gac. After the contract Gac is deployed, some relay full nodes (e.g. one
or two) are recruited to join the protocol by depositing an amount of $k · dF in
the contract. The public keys of the relay(s) are also recorded by contract Gac.
Once the setup phase is done, each relay full node places the initial deposits
$k · dF and the light client deposit $k · dL, which will be used to deter their
deviations from the protocol. At the same time, LW records the public keys of
the relay(s), and then disconnects the trusted full node to work independently.
In practice, the setup can be done by using many fast bootstrap methods
[68,56,47], which allows the user to efficiently launch a personal trusted full
node in the PC. So the light client (e.g. a smart-phone) can connect to the
PC to sync. Remark that, besides the cryptographic security parameter λ, the
protocol is specified with some other parameters:
• k: The protocol is expired, after the client requests the relay(s) to evaluate
some chain predicates for k times.
• k · dL: This is the deposit placed by the client to initialize the protocol.
• k · dF : The initial deposit of a full node to join the protocol as a relay node.
• p: Later in each query, the client shall place this amount to cover the well-
deserved payment of the relay(s).
• e: Later in each query, the client shall place this deposit e in addition to p.
Repeatable query phase. Once the setup is done, LW disconnects the trusted
full node, and can ask the relay(s) to query some chain predicates repeatedly.
During the queries, LW can message the arbiter contract, but cannot read the
internal states of Gac. Informally, each query proceeds as:
1. Request. In each query, LW firstly sends a request message to the contract
Gac, which encapsulates detailed specifications of a chain predicate P`(·),
along with a deposit denoted by $(p+ e), where $p is the promised payment
and $e is a deposit refundable only when LW reports what it receives from
the relays.
Once Gac receives the request message from LW, Gac further parameterizes
the chain predicate P` as P`N , where N ← T represents the current global
time (i.e. the latest blockchain height).
2. Response. The the relay full node(s) can learn the predicate P`N under query
(whose ground truth is fixed since N is fixed and would not be flipped with
the growth of the global timer T ), and the settlement of the deposit $(p+ e)
by reading the arbiter contract.
Then, the relay node can evaluate the predicate P`N with using its local
blockchain replica as auxiliary input. When P`N = True, the relay node
shall send the client a response message including a proof σ for trueness,
which can be verified by the arbiter contract but not the light client; in case
P`N = False, the “honest” full node shall reply to the light client with a
response message including ⊥.
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In addition, when the relay sends a response message to LW off-chain,4 it also
authenticates the message by attaching its signature (which is also bounded
to an increasing only counter to prevent replaying).
3. Evaluate & Feedback. Upon receiving a response message from the relay
Ri, LW firstly verifies that it is authenticated by a valid signature sigi.
If sigi is valid, LW parses the response message to check whether Ri claims
P`N = True or P
`
N = False. If receiving consistent response message(s)
from all recruited relay(s), the light client decides this consistently claimed
True/False.
Then the client sends a feedback message to the contract Gac with containing
these signed response message(s).
Remark we do not assume the client follows the protocol to output and feeds
back to the contract. Instead, we focus on proving “following the protocol
to decide an output” is the sequential rational strategy of the client.
4. Payout. Upon receiving the feedback message sent from the light client, the
contract Gac shall invoke the Incentive subroutine to facilitate some payoffs.
Functionality-wise, the payoff rules of the incentive subroutine would punish
and/or reward the relay node(s) and the light client, such that none of them
would deviate from the protocol.
Remark on correctness. It is immediate to see the correctness: when all parties are
honest, the relay(s) receive the payment pre-specified due to incentive mechanism
in the contract, and the client always outputs the ground truth of chain predicate.
Remark on security. The security would depend on the payoffs clauses facilitated
by the incentive subroutine, which will be elaborated in later subsections as
we decouple the protocol and the incentive design. Intuitively, if the incentive
subroutines does nothing, there is no security to any extent; since following the
protocol is not any variant of equilibrium. Thus, the incentive mechanism must
be carefully designed to finely tune the payoffs, in order to make the sequential
equilibrium to be following the protocol.
6 Adding incentives for security
Without a proper incentive subroutine, our simple light-client protocol is seem-
ingly insecure to any extent, considering at least the relay nodes are well moti-
vated to cheat the client. So this section formally treats the light-client protocol
as an extensive game, and then studies on how to squeeze most out of the “hand-
icapped” abilities of the arbiter contract to design proper incentives, such that
the utility function of the game can be well adjusted to deter any party from
deviating at any stage of the protocol’s extensive game.
4 Note that we assume the off-chain communication can be established on demand in
the paper, which in practice can be done through a name service or “broadcasting”
encrypted network addresses through the blockchain [57].
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6.1 Challenges of designing incentives
The main challenge of designing proper incentives to prevent the parties from
deviating is the “handicapped” abilities of the arbiter contract Gac: there is no
proof for a claim of P`N = False, so Gac cannot directly catch a liar who claims
bogus P`N = False. We conquer the above issue in the rational setting, by
allowing the contract Gac to believe unverifiable claims are correctly forwarded by
rational relay(s), even if no cryptographic proofs for them. Our solution centers
around the fact: if a claim of P`N = False is actually fake, there shall exist a
succinct cryptographic proof for P`N = True, which can falsify the bogus claim
of P`N = False. As such, we derive the basic principles of designing proper
incentives in different scenarios:
• When there are two non-cooperative relays, we create an incentive to leverage
non-cooperative parties to audit each other, so sending fake P`N = False
become irrational and would not happen.
• When there is only one relay node (which models that there are no non-
cooperative relays at all), we somehow try an incentive design to let the full
node “audit” itself, which means: the relay would get a higher payment, as
long as it presents a verifaible claim instead of an unverifiable claim. So the
relay is somehow motivated to “audit” itself.
6.2 “Light-client game” of the protocol
Here we present the structure of “light-client game” for the simple light-client
protocol presented in the earlier section. We would showcase how the extensive
game does capture (i) all polynomial-time computable strategies and (ii) the
incomplete information received during the course of the protocol.
Game structure for two relays. For the case of recruiting two (non-cooperative)
relays, we denote the “light-client” game as Γ k2 . It has a repetition structure (i.e.,
a stage game Γ2) that can be repeated up to k times as shown in Fig 4 (a), since
the client can raise queries for up to k times in the protocol. More precisely,
for each query, the protocol proceeds as the following incomplete-information
extensive stage game Γ2:
1. Client makes a query. The client moves, with two optional actions Q and B.
Q denotes “sending a request message to query”, and B denotes “others”
(including abort). The game only proceeds when the light client acts Q.
2. Chance chooses the truth. At the historyQ, the special player “chance” moves,
with two possible actions a and a′.
Let a represent P`N = True, and a
′ for P`N = False. The occurrence of a and
a′ follows an arbitrary distribution [ρ, 1− ρ]. Note the action of chance can
be observed by the relay full nodes but not the client.
3. Relay responds. At histories Q(a|a′), 5 the relay node R1 acts, with three
available actions {t, f, x}:
5 Remark that we are using standard regular expressions to denote the histories and
information set. For example, Q(a|a′) represents {Qa,Qa′}
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Fig. 4. The repetition structure of the light-client game in one query: (a) two non-
cooperative relays (i.e. Γ2); (b) one single relay (i.e. Γ1). The last actions of the client
are not shown for presentation simplicity.
• The action t means R1 forwards the ground truth of P`N to LW (with
attaching correct “proofs” if there are any).6
• The action f represents that R1 forwards the opposite of the ground
truth of chain predicate to LW.
• The action x means as others, including abort and some attempts to
break the cryptographic primitives.
4. The other relay responds. At histories Q(a|a′)(t|f |x), it is the turn of R2 to
move. Since R1 and R2 are non-cooperative, histories Qa(t|f |x) make of an
information set of R2 denoted by I1, and similarly, Qa′(t|f |x) is another
information set I2. At either I1 or I2, R2 has three actions {t, f, x}, which
can be understood as same as the actions of R1 at Q(a|a′), since R1 and R2
are exchangeable notations.
5. Client feeds back and outputs. Then the game Γ2 reaches the historiesQ(a|a′)(t|f |x)(t|f |x).
As shown in Fig 4, the client LW is facing nine information sets7: ILW1 =
Q(att|a′ff), ILW2 = Q(atf |a′ft), ILW3 = Q(at|a′f)x, ILW4 = Q(aft|a′tf),
ILW5 = Q(aff |a′tt), ILW6 = Q(af |a′t)x, ILW7 = Q(axt|a′xf), ILW8 = Q(axf |a′xt),
ILW9 = Q(a|a′)xx. At these information sets, the light client shall choose a
probabilistic polynomial-time ITM to: (i) send a feedback message back to
the contract, and (ii) decide an output. So the available actions of the client
at each information set can be interpreted as follows:
6 There exists another strategy to claim the truth of the predicate when the predicate
is indeed true, but with invalid proof. This strategy is strictly dominated and would
not be adopted at all, since it neither fools the client, nor get through the verification
of contract to get any reward. We therefore omit it.
7 Remark that the histories Qatt and Qa′ff cannot be distinguished by the light
client, because for the light client, both of them correspond that two claims of True.
All the nine information sets of the light client can be translated similarly.
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• From ILW1 to ILW5 , the client receives two response messages from both
relays in time, and it can take an action out of {T, L,R,X}×{A,A′, O}:
T means to report the arbiter contract Gac both of the response; L (or R)
represents that LW reports to the contract Gac only one response message
sent from R1 (or R2); X represents others, including abort; A means to
output True; A′ is to output False; O denotes to output nothing.
• Through ILW3 to ILW8 , the client LW receives only one response message
from R1 (or R2), and can take an action out of {T,X} × {A,A′, O}:
T means to report the contract Gac the only response message that it
receives; X means to do others, including abort; A, A′ and O have the
same concrete meaning as before.
• At ILW9 , LW receives nothing from the relays in time, it can take an
action out of {T,X} × {A,A′, O}: T can be translated as to send the
contract nothing until the contract times out, X represents others (for
example, trying to crack digital signature scheme); A, A′ and O still have
the same meaning as before.
After all above actions are made, the protocol completes one query, and can
go to the next query, as long as it is not expired or the client does not abort. So
the protocol’s game Γ k2 (capturing all k queries) can be inductively defined by
repeating the above structure up to k times.
Game structure for one relay. For the case of recruiting only one relay to
request up to k queries, we denote the protocol’s “light-client” game as Γ k1 . As
shown in Fig 4 (b), it has a repetition structure (i.e. the stage game Γ1) similar to
the game Γ2, except few differences related to the information sets and available
actions of the light client. In particular, when the client receives response from
the only relay, it would face three information sets, namely, Q(at|a′f), Q(af |a′t)
and Q(ax|a′x), instead of nine in Γ2. At each information set, the client always
can take an action out of {T,X}×{A,A′, O}, which has the same interpretation
in the game Γ2. Since Γ1 is extremely similar to Γ2, we omit such details here.
What if no incentive? If the arbiter contract facilitates no incentive, the
possible execution result of the protocol can be concretely interpreted due to
the economic aspects of our model as follows:
• When the client is fooled. The client loses $v, and the relayRi earns $vi. Note
$v is related to the value attached to the chain predicate under query, say
the transacted amount, due to our economic model; and $vi is the malicious
benefit earned by Ri if the client if fooled.
• When the client outputs the ground truth. The relay would not earn any
malicious benefit, and the client would not lose any value attached to the
chain predicate either.
• When the client outputs nothing. The relay would lose $c, which means it
will launch its own (personal) full node to query the chain predicate. In such
case, the relay would not learn any malicious benefit.
It is clear to see that without proper incentives to tune the above outcomes,
the game cannot reach a desired equilibrium to let all parties follow the protocol,
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because at least the relays are well motivated to cheat the client. Thus we lever-
age the deposits placed by the client and relay(s) to design simple yet still useful
incentives in next subsections, such that we can fine tune the above outcome to
realize a utility function obtaining desired equilibrium, thus achieving security.
6.3 Basic incentive mechanism
The incentive subroutine takes the feedback message sent from the client as input,
and then facilitates rewards/punishments accordingly. After that, the utility
function of the “light-client game” is supposed to be well tuned to ensure security.
Here we will present such the carefully designed incentive subroutine, and analyze
the incentive makes the “light-client game” secure to what extent.
Basic incentive for two relays. If two non-cooperative relays can be recruited,
the incentive subroutine takes the feedback message from the client as input, and
then facilitates the incentives following hereunder general principles:
• It firstly verifies whether the feedback from the light client indeed encap-
sulates some responses that were originally sent from R1 and/or R2 (w.r.t.
the current chain predicate under query). If feedback contains two validly
signed responses, return $e to the client; If feedback contain one validly signed
response, return $e/2 to the client.
• If a relay claims P`N = True with attaching an invalid proof σ, its deposit
for this query (i.e. $dF ) is confiscated and would not receive any payment.
• When a relay sends a response message containing ⊥ to claim P`N = False,
there is no succinct proof attesting the claim. The incentive subroutine checks
whether the other relay full node provides a proof attesting P`N = True. If
the other relay proves P`N = True, the cheating relay loses its deposit this
query (i.e. $dF ) and would not receive any payment. For the other relay that
falsifies the cheating claim of P`N = False, the incentive subroutine assigns
it some extra bonuses (e.g. doubled payment).
• After each query, if the contract does not notice a full node is misbehaving
(i.e., no fake proof for truthness or fake claim of falseness), it would pay the
node $p/2 as the basic reward (for the honest full node). In addition, the
contract returns a portion of the client’s initial deposit (i.e. $dL). Moreover,
the contract returns a portion of each relay’s initial deposit (i.e. $dF ), if the
incentive subroutine does not observe the relay cheats during this query.
The rationale behind the incentive design is straightforward. First, during
any query, the rational light client will always report to the contract whatever
the relays actually forward, since the failure of doing so always causes strictly
less utility, no matter the strategy of the relay full nodes; Second, since the
two relay full nodes are non-cooperative, they would be incentivized to audit
each other, such that the attempt of cheating the client is deterred. To demon-
strate above general reward/punishment principles of the incentive mechanism
are implementable, we concretely instantiate its pseudocode that are deferred to
Appendix C.1.
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Basic incentive for one relay. When any two recruited relays might collude,
the situation turns to be pessimistic, as the light client is now requesting an
unknown information from only a single distrustful coalition. To argue security
in such the pessimistic case, we consider only one relay in the protocol. To deal
with the pessimistic case, we tune the incentive subroutine by incorporating the
next major tuning (different from the the incentive for two relays):
• If the relay claims P`N = False, its deposit is returned, but it receives a
payment less than $p, namely, $(p − r) where $r ∈ [0, p] is a parameter of
the incentive.
• Other payoff rules are same to the basic incentive mechanism for two non-
cooperative relays.
To demonstrate the above delicately tuned incentive is implementable, we show-
case its pseudocode that is deferred to Appendix C.2.
6.4 Security analysis for basic incentive
Utility function. Putting the financial outcome of protocol executions together
with the incentive mechanism, we can eventually derive the utility functions
of game Γ k2 and game Γ
k
1 , inductively. The formal definitions of utilities are
deferred to Appendix D. Given such utility functions, we can precisely analyze
the light-client game Γ k2 (and the game Γ
k
1 ) to precisely understand our light-
client protocol is secure to what extent.
Security theorems of basic incentive. For the case of two non-cooperative
relays, the security of the basic incentive mechanism can be formally abstracted
as Theorem 1:
Theorem 1. If two non-cooperative relays are recruited, the sequential equilib-
rium of Γ k2 can ensure the game Γ
k
2 terminates in a terminal history belonging
Zgood := (QattTA|Qa′ttTA′){k} (i.e. no deviation from the protocol), condi-
tioned on dF + p/2 > vi and dL > (p+ e).
For the case of one single relay, the security of the basic incentive mechanism
can be formally abstracted as:
Theorem 2. In the pessimistic case where is one single relay, the sequential
equilibrium can ensure the game Γ k1 terminates in Zgood := (QatTA|Qa′tTA′){k}
(i.e. no deviation from the protocol), conditioned on dF + p− r > vi, r > vi and
dL > (p+ e).
Interpretations of Theorem 1. The theorem reveals that: conditioned on
there are two non-cooperative relays, the sufficient conditions of security are:
(i) the initial deposit dF of relay node is greater than its malicious benefit vi
that can be obtained by fooling the client; (ii) the initial deposit dL of the
client is greater than the payment p plus another small parameter e. The above
conclusion essentially hints us how to safely set up the light-client protocol to
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instantiate a cryptocurrency wallet in practice, that is: let the light client and
the relays finely tune and specify their initial deposits, such that the client can
query the (non)existence of any transaction, as long as the transacted amount of
the transaction is not greater than the initial deposit placed by the relay nodes.
Interpretations of Theorem 2. The theorem states that: even in an extremely
hostile scenario where only one single relay exists, deviations are still prevented
when fooling the light client to believe the non-existence of an existing trans-
action does not yield better payoff than honestly proving the existence. The
statement presents a feasibility region of our protocol that at least captures
many important DApps (e.g. decentralized messaging apps) in practice, namely:
fooling the client is not very financially beneficial for the relay, and only brings
a payoff vi to the relay; so as long the client prefers to pay a little bit more than
vi to read a record in the blockchain, no one would deviate from the protocol.
6.5 Augmented incentive
This subsection further discusses the pessimistic scenario that no non-cooperative
relays can be identified, by introducing an extra assumption that: at least one
public full node (denoted by PFN ) can monitor the internal states of the arbiter
contract at negligible cost , and does not cooperate with the only recruited relay.
This extra rationality assumption can boost an incentive mechanism to deter the
relay and client from deviating from the light-client protocol. Here we present
this augmented incentive design, and analyze its security guarantees.
Augmented incentive for one relay. The tuning of the incentive mechanism
stems from the observation that: if there is any public full node that does not
cooperate with the recruited relay (and monitor the internal states of the arbiter
contract), it can stand out to audit a fake claim about P`N = False by producing
a proof attesting P`N = True. Thus, we slightly tune the incentive subroutine
(by adding few lines of pseudocode), which can be summarized as:
• When a relay forwards a response message containing ⊥ to claim P`N =
False, the incentive subroutine shall wait few clock periods (e.g., one). Dur-
ing the waiting time, the public full node is allowed to send a proof attesting
P`N = True in order to falsify a fake claim of P
`
N = False; in this case, the
initial deposit dF of the cheating relay is confiscated and sent to the public
full node who stands out.
• Other payoff rules are same to the basic incentive mechanism, so do not
involve the public full node.
We defer the formal instantiation of the above augmented incentive mecha-
nism to Appendix C.3.
6.6 Security analysis for augmented incentive
Augmented “light-client game”. By the introduction of the extra incentive
clause, the “light-client game” Γ1 is extended to the augmented light-client game
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G1. As shown in Fig 5, the major differences from the original light-client game
Γ1 are two aspects: (i) the public full node (PFN ) can choose to monitor the
arbiter contract (denoted by m) or otherwise (x) in each query, which cannot be
told by the relay node due to the non-cooperation, and (ii) when the ground truth
of predicate is true, if the relay cheats, PFN has an action “debate” by showing
the incentive mechanism a proof attesting the predicate is true, conditioned on
having taken action m.
The security intuition thus becomes clear: if the recruited relay chooses a
strategy to cheat with non-negligible probability, the best strategy of the public
full node is to act m, which on the contrary deters the relay from cheating. In
the other word, the relay at most deviate with negligible probability.
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Fig. 5. The induced game G1, if having a non-cooperative public full node.
Security theorem of augmented incentive. Now, in the augmented game G1,
if the recruited relay deviates when the predicate is true with non-negligible
probability, the rational PFN would act m and then d, which will confiscate
the initial deposit of the relay and deters it from cheating. More precisely, the
security due to the augmented incentive mechanism can be summarized as:
Theorem 3. Given the augmented incentive mechanism, the sequential equilib-
rium of the augmented light-client game G1 can ensure the client and the relay
would not deviate from the protocol except with negligible probability, conditioned
on dF > vi, dL > (p+ e), and a non-cooperative public full node that can “mon-
itor” the arbiter contract costlessly.
Interpretations of Theorem 3. The economics behind the theorem can be
translated similarly to Theorem 1.
7 Towards concrete instantiation
Here we shed light on the concrete instantiation of the protocol in practice
and emphasize some tips towards feasibility. Though the current permissionless
blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) are suffering from many baby-age limitations (e.g.,
high cost of on-chain resources, low throughput, and large latency), a straight
instantiation of our light-client protocol has been arguably practical.
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On- and off-chain feasibility. As shown in Table 1, we instantiate the protocol
atop Ethereum (with recruiting one relay and using the basic incentive mech-
anism, c.f. subsection 6.4), and measure the costs of repeatedly evaluating five
chain predicates about the (non)existence of different Ethereum transactions.
Due to the simple nature of our protocol, the off-chain cost of the light client
is constant and essentially tiny, as it only needs: (i) to store two public keys, (ii)
to instantiate two secure channels to connect the relay nodes (e.g. the off-chain
response message is < 1KB), (iii) to verify two signatures and to compute a few
hashes to few verify Merkle tree proof(s) in the worst case.
Table 1. An instance of the light-client protocol (basic incentive w/ one relay) that
allows the superlight client to predicate the (non)existence up to five Ether transactions.
txid queried for
evaluating (non)existence
Gas of request
(LW → Gac)
Size of response
(Ri → LW)
Gas of feedback
(LW → Gac )
0x141989127035... 71,120 gas 947 Byte 199,691 gas
0x0661d6e95ab1... 41,120 gas 951 Byte 251,480 gas
0x949ae094deb0... 41,120 gas 949 Byte 257,473 gas
0x1e39d5b4b46d... 41,120 gas 985 Byte 339,237 gas
0xfe28a4dffb8e... 41,120 gas 951 Byte 248,119 gas
Besides the straightforward off-chain efficiency, the on-chain cost is also low.
Particularly, the client only sends two messages (i.e. request and feedback) to the
contract, which typically costs mere 300k gases in the worst case as shown in
Table 1. At the time of writing (Jan/13/2020), ether is $143 each [4], and the
average gas price is 10 Gwei [2], which corresponds to a cost of only $0.43.
Latency. If the network diffuse functionality [30] can approximate the latency
of global Internet [7,33], the delay of our light-client protocol will be dominated
by the limitations of underlying blockchain. The reasons are: (i) many existing
blockchains have limited on-chain resources, and the miners are more willing to
pack the transactions having higher transaction fees [63,75,7], and (ii) messaging
the contract suffers from the intrinsic delay caused by underlying consensus. For
example, in Ethereum network at the time of writing, if the light client sets its
transactions at the average gas price (i.e., 9 Gwei), the latency of messaging the
contract on average will include: (i) 10 blocks (about two minutes) [2] for being
mined, plus (ii) a few more blocks for confirmations (another a few minutes) [36].
If the client expects the protocol to proceed faster, it can set higher gas price
(e.g., 22 Gwei per gas), which causes its messages to be included after 2-3 blocks
on average (i.e. about 30-45 seconds) [2], though the on-chain cost increases
by 144%. After all, once the underlying blockchain goes through the baby-age
limitations, the protocol’s latency can be further reduced to approximate the
actual Internet delay.
Who are the relays? The light-client protocol can be deployed in any blockchain
supporting smart contracts. The relays in the protocol can be the full nodes of
the chain (e.g., the full nodes of two competing mining pools) that are seek-
ing the economic rewards by relaying blockchain readings to the light clients,
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so it is reasonable to assume that they can maintain the full nodes to evaluate
chain predicates nearly costlessly. Even in the extremely adversarial environ-
ment where the light client has no confidence in the non-collusion of any two
full nodes, the protocol can still be finely tuned (e.g. increase the rewards) to
support at least a wide range of useful low-value chain predicates.
Setup and initial deposits. We explicitly decouple the presentations of “pro-
tocol” and “incentive mechanism” to provide the next insight: the initial deposits
are not restricted to cryptocurrency as in our design, and they can be any form
of “deposits”, such as reputations; especially, if such “deposits” is off the chain
and public known, the setup phase also becomes arguably removable.
8 Conclusion & Future Outlook
We present a generic superlight client for permissionless blockchains in the game-
theoretic model. Our protocol corresponds a special variant of multi-party com-
putation in the rational setting [11,40,29,46,42,5], in particular, by adopting the
smart contract to implement a concrete utility function for desired equilibrium.
This is the first work that formally discusses the light clients of permission-
less blockchains in game-theoretic settings, and the area remains largely unex-
plored. Particularly, a few potential studies can be conducted to explore more
realistic instantiations. For example, many crypto-economic protocols (e.g. PoS
blockchains [48,21,37], payment channels [61,26], blockchain-backed assets [77])
already introduce many locked deposits, and it becomes enticing to explore the
composability of using the same collateral in our lightweight protocol without
scarifying the securities of both protocols.
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A Merkle Tree Algorithms
Fig 6, 7 and 8 are the deferred algorithms related to Merkle tree. A Merkle tree
(denoted by MT) is a binary tree: (i) the i-th leaf node is labeled by H(txi), where
H is a cryptographic hash function; (ii) any non-leaf node in the Merkle tree is
labeled by the hash of the labels of its siblings. BuildMT(·) takes a sequence
of transactions as input, and outputs a Merkle tree whose root commits these
transactions. GenMTP takes a Merkle tree MT and a transaction tx as input, and
can generate a Merkle tree proof pi for the inclusion of tx in the tree. Finally,
VrfyMTP takes H(tx), the tree root, and the Merkle proof pi, and can output
whether H(tx) labels a leaf of the Merkle tree MT. The security notions of
Merkle tree can be found in Section 3.
BuildMT algorithm
BuildMT(TX = (tx1, · · · , txn)):
• if |TX| = 1:
– label(root) = H(tx1)
• else:
– lchild = BuildMT(tx1, . . . , txdn/2e)
– rchild = BuildMT(txdn/2e+1, . . . , txn)
– label(root) = H(label(lchild)||label(rchild))
• return Merkle tree MT with root
Fig. 6. BuildMT that generates a Merkle tree with root for TX = (tx1, · · · , txn).
GenMTP algorithm
GenMTP(MT, tx):
• x← the leaf node labeled by H(tx)
• while x 6= label(MT.root):
– lchild← x.parent.lchild
– rchild← x.parent.rchild
– if x = lchild, bi ← 0, li = label(rchild)
– otherwise, bi ← 1, li = label(lchild)
– x← x.parent
• return pi = ((li, bi))i∈[1,n]
Fig. 7. GenMTP that generates a Merkle tree proof.
VrfyMTP algorithm
VrfyMTP(lable(root), pi,H(tx)):
• parse pi as a list ((li, bi))i∈[1,n]
• x = H(tx)
• for i in [1, n]:
– if bi = 0, x← H(x||li), else x← H(li||x)
• if x 6= lable(root), return False, otherwise return True
Fig. 8. VrfyMTP that verifies a Merkle tree proof.
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B Deferred game-theory definitions
Here down below are the deferred formal definitions of the finite incomplete-
information extensive-form game and the sequential equilibrium.
Definition 1. Finite incomplete-information extensive-form game Γ is
a tuple of 〈N,H, P, fc, (ui)i∈N, (Ii)i∈N〉 [64]:
• N is a finite set representing the players.
• H is a set of sequences that satisfies: (i) ∅ ∈ H; (ii) if h = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H,
then any prefix of h belongs to H. Each member of H is a history se-
quence. The elements of a history are called actions. A history sequence
h = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H is terminal, iff h is not a prefix of any other his-
tories in H. Let Z denote the set of terminal histories. For any non-terminal
history h = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H \ Z, the set of actions available after h can be
defined as A(h) = {a|〈a1, . . . , aK , a〉 ∈ H}.
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {chance} is the player function to assign a player (or
chance) to move at a non-terminal history h. Particularly when P (h) =
chance, a special “player” called chance acts at the history h.
• (ui)i∈N : Z → R|N| is the utility function that defines the utility of the
players at each terminal history (e.g., ui(h) specifies the utility of player i at
the terminal history h).
• fc is a function associating each history h ∈ {h|P (h) = chance} with a
probability measure fc(;h) on A(h), i.e., fc(a;h) determines the probability
of the occurrence of a ∈ A(h) after the history h of the player “ chance”.
• (Ii)i∈N is a set of partitions. Each Ii is a partition for the set {h|P (h) = i},
and called as the information partition of player i; a member Ii,j of the
partition Ii is a set of histories, and is said to be an information set of
player i. We require A(h) = A(h′) if h and h′ are in the same information
set, and then denote the available actions of player i at an information set
Ii,j ∈ Ii as A(Ii,j).
Note that in our context, the strategy of a player is actually a probabilistic
polynomial-time ITM, whose action is to produce a string feed to the protocol.
Definition 2. A behavioral strategy (or strategy for short) of player i (denoted
by si) is a collection of independent probability measures denoted by {βi(Ii,j)}Ii,j∈Ii ,
where βi(Ii,j) is a probability measure over A(Ii,j) (i.e., the available actions of
player i at his information set Ii,j). We say s = (s)i∈N is a behavior strategy
profile (or strategy profile for short), if every si ∈ s is a behavior strategy of
player i. When s = ({βi(Ii,j)}Ii,j∈Ii)i∈N assigns positive probability to every
action, it is called completely mixed.
Definition 3. An assessment σ in an extensive game is a pair (s, µ), where s is
a behavioral strategy profile and µ is a function that assigns to every information
set a probability measure on the set of histories in the information set (i.e.,
every). We say the function µ is a belief system.
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Definition 4. The expected utility of a player i determined by the assessment
σ = (s, µ) conditioned on Ii,j is defined as:
u¯i(s, µ|Ii,j) =
∑
h∈Ii,j
µ(Ii,j)(h)
∑
z∈Z
ρ(s|h)(z)ui(z)
where h = 〈a1, . . . , aL〉 ∈ H \ Z, z = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ Z, and ρ(σ|h)(z) denotes
the distribution over terminal histories induced by the strategy profile s condi-
tioned on the history h being reached (for player P (h) to take an action), i.e.,
ρ(s|h)(z) =
{
0, if h is not a prefix of z∏K−1
k=L βP (a1,...,ak)(a1, . . . , ak)(ak+1), otherwise
Definition 5. We say an assessment σ = (σ, µ) is a -sequential equilibrium,
if it is -sequentially rational and consistent:
• (s, µ) is -sequentially rational if for every play i ∈ N and his every informa-
tion set Ii,j ∈ Ii, the strategy si of player i is a best response to the others’
strategies s−i given his belief at Ii,j , i.e., u¯i(s, µ|Ii,j)+ ≥ u¯i((s∗i , s−i), µ|Ii,j)
for every strategy s∗i of every player i at every information set Ii,j ∈ Ii. Note
that s−i denotes the strategy profile s with its i-th element removed, and
(s∗, s−i) denotes s with its i-th element replaced by s∗.
• (s, µ) is consistent, if ∃ a sequence of assessments ((sk, µk))∞k=1 converges to
(s, µ), where sk is completely mixed and µk is derived from sk by Bayes’
rules.
C Deferred formal description of incentive subroutines
C.1 Basic incentive for the protocol with two relays
Fig 9, 10 and 11 showcase the basic incentive mechanism for two relays is im-
plementable with being given the validateTrue algorithm. Fig 10 presents the
detailed incentive clauses when the client feeds back two validly signed response
messages from both recruited relays (clause 1-6). Fig 11 presents how to deal
with the scenario where the client only feeds back one validly signed response
message from only relay (clause 7-9). In case the client feeds back nothing, every
party simply gets their initial deposit back (clause 10), while the locked deposit
$(p+ e) of the client (for this query) is “burnt”.
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Incentive subroutine for two non-cooperative relays
Incentive(responses,P`N ):
if |responses| = 2 then
parse {(resulti, sigi)}i∈{1,2} := responses
if vrfySig(〈resulti, ctr〉, sigi, pk1) = 1 for each i ∈ [1, 2]
call Payout(result1, result2,P
`
N ) subroutine in Fig 10
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
return
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti, sigi)} := responses
if vrfy(resulti||ctr, sigi) = 1
call Payout′(resulti,P`N ) subroutine in Fig 11
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
return
// Clause 10
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $dF
ledger[R|1−i|] := ledger[R|1−i|] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
Fig. 9. Incentive subroutine (two non-cooperative relays).
Payout subroutine
Payout(result1, result2,P
`
N ):
if result1 can be parsed as σ1 then
if validateTrue(σ1,P
`
N ) = 1 then
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 1 then // Clause 1
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $( p2 + dF ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e)
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 0 // Clause 2
ledger[R1] := ledger[R1] + $(p+ 32dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ dF2 )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 3
ledger[R1] := ledger[R1] + $(p+ 32dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ dF2 )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ1,P
`
N ) = 0
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 1 then // Clause 2
ledger[R2] := ledger[R2] + $(p+ 32dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ dF2 )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 0 // Clause 4
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p+ e+ 2dF )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 5
ledger[R1] := ledger[R1] + $(p/2− r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p2 + e+ r + dF )
else // i.e., result1 = ⊥
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 1 then // Clause 3
ledger[R2] := ledger[R2] + $(p+ 3dF2 )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ dF2 )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2,P
`
N ) = 0 // Clause 5
ledger[R2] := ledger[R2] + $(p/2− r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p2 + e+ r + dF )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 6
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $( p2 − r + dF ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ 2r)
Fig. 10. Payout subroutine called by Fig 9.
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Payout′ subroutine
Payout′(resulti,P`N ):
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 1 then // Clause 7
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $(p+ dF )
ledger[R|1−i|] := ledger[R|1−i|] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( e2 )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 0 // Clause 8
ledger[R|1−i|] := ledger[R|1−i|] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p+e2 +
dF
2 )
else // i.e., resulti = ⊥ // Clause 9
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $( p2 − r + dF )
ledger[R|1−i|] := ledger[R|1−i|] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( e2 + r)
Fig. 11. Payout′ subroutine called by Fig 9.
C.2 Basic incentive for the protocol with one single relay
When the light client protocol is joined by only one single relay node (which
models that the client does not believe there are non-cooperative relays), we
tune the incentive to let the only relay node to audit itself by “asymmetrically”
pay the proved claim of truthness and the unproved claim of falseness (with an
extra protocol parameter r), and thus forwarding the correct evaluation result
of the chain predicate becomes dominating.
Remark that the similar tuning can be straightly adopted by the incentive
subroutine of the protocol for two relays; actually, we already incorporate the
idea of introducing the extra parameter r in the incentive subroutine of the
protocol for two relays. For presentation simplicity, we analyze the effect of the
idea of using “asymmetrically” payoffs for one single relay (instead of the two
colluding relays).
Incentive subroutine for one single relay
Incentive(responses,P`N ):
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti, sigi)} := responses
if vrfy(resulti||ctr, sigi) = 1
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 1 then
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $(p+ dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 0
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p+ e+ dF )
else // i.e., resulti = ⊥
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $(p− r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e+ r)
return
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
Fig. 12. Incentive subroutine for the protocol with (one single relay).
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C.3 Augmented incentive for the protocol with one relay
Here is the augmented incentive mechanism for the protocol with one single
relay. Different from the aforementioned idea of using incentive to create “self-
audition”, we explicitly allow extra public full nodes to audit the relay node in
the system. To do so, the incentive subroutine has to wait for some “debating”
message sent from the public, once it receives the feedback from the client about
what the relay node does forward. In the relay node is cheating to claim a fake
unprovable side, the public can generate a proof attesting that the relay was
dishonest, thus allowing the contract punish the cheating relay.
Incentive subroutine for one single relay
Incentive(responses,P`N ):
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti, sigi)} := responses
if vrfy(resulti||ctr, sigi) = 1
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 1 then
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $(p+ dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi,P
`
N ) = 0
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p+ e+ dF )
else // i.e., resulti = ⊥
Tdebate := T +∆T
debate := P`N
return
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
Debate. Upon receiving (debating,P`N , σpfn) from PFN :
assert debate 6= ∅ and debate = P`N
if validateTrue(σpfn,P
`
N ) = 1 then:
ledger[PFN ] := ledger[PFN ] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p+ e)
debate := ∅
Timer. Upon T ≥ Tdebate and debate 6= ∅:
ledger[Ri] := ledger[Ri] + $(dF + p)
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
debate := ∅
Fig. 13. Augmented Incentive subroutine (a single relay) with another public full node.
D Inductive increments of utilities
Let h denote a history in Γ k2 the to represent the beginning of a reachable query,
at which the LW moves to determine whether to abort or not, and then chance,
R1, R2 and LW sequentially move. Then the utilities of LW, R1 and R2 can
be defined recursively as shown in Table 2, 3 and 4.
We make the following remarks about the recursive definition of the utilities:
(i) when h := ∅, set uLW(h) := 0, uR1(h) := 0, and uR2(h) := 0; (ii) uLW(h) =
uLW(h) + dL and the utility functions depict the final outcomes of the players,
when |h| = 6k (i.e. the protocol expires); (iii) when the chance choose a and the
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lightweight client outputs A′, or when the chance choose a′ and the lightweight
client outputs A, the light client is fooled, which means its utility increment shall
subtract v, and the utility increments of R1 and R2 shall add v1 := v1(P1h,C)
and v2 := v2(P
1
h,C) respectively; (iv) when the light client outputs O, which
means the client decides to setup its own full node and c is subtracted from
its utility increment to reflect the cost. Also note that if two non-cooperative
relays R1 and R2 share no common conflict of cheating the light client, one more
constrain is applied to ensure v1(P
1
h,C) · v2(P1h,C) = 0.
The utility functions of game Γ k1 and G
k
1 can be inductively defined similarly.
E Proofs for security theorems
E.1 Proof for theorem 1
Lemma 1. If the client raises a query in the game Γ k2 , the sequentially rational
strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will not include L, R
and X (i.e., the light client will always take T to report the contract the whatever
it receives from the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. It is clear to see the Lemma from the recursive formulation of the utility
function of LW. Because no matter at any history of any information set, taking
an action including L, R or X is dominated by replacing the character by T .
Lemma 2. At the last query (history h) in the game Γ k2 , if the client raises
the last query (i.e. reaching the history hQ), when non-cooperative R1 and R2
are non-cooperative, the game terminates in hQ(attTA|a′ttTA′), conditioned on
dF + p/2 > vi.
Proof. Let the history h denote any history where is the turn of the light
client to choose from {Q,B}. If the client raises the query due to Lemma 5,
it can be seen that the only reachable histories from h must have the prefix of:
hQ(a|a′)(t|f |x)(t|f |x)T (A|A′|O).
Say hQ(a|a′)(t|f |x)(t|f |x)T (A|A′|O) terminates the game, and w.l.o.g. let
Ri choose to deviate from t. Due to such the strategy of Ri, a belief system
of Rj consistent with that has to assign some non-negligible probability to the
history corresponding that Ri takes an action off t, so the best response of Rj
after h is also to take action t according to the utility definitions. Then we can
reason the sequential rationality backwardly: in any information set of the full
nodes, the best response of the relay full nodes is to take action t. Thus the
strategy of Ri consistent to Rj ’s strategy must act t. Note the joint strategy σ
that R1 and R2 always choose the action of t and the LW always chooses the
strategy of T . So for the light client, its belief system consistent with the fact
must assign the probability of 1 to hQatt out of the information set of ILW1 and
the probability of 1 to hQa′tt out of the information set of ILW5 . Conditioned
on such the belief, the light client must choose TA in ILW1 and choose TA
′ in
ILW5 . This completes the proof for the lemma.
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Table 2. The recursive definition of utility function: h denotes a history in Γ k2 the
to represent any history at which LW moves to determine raise a query or abort the
protocol “-” means an unreachable history. (To be continued in Table 3)
Info Set
of LW
Histories
of LW
Actions
of LW
Utility of LW Utility of R1 Utility of R2
I1LW
hQatt
TA uLW (h) + dL − p uR1 (h) + p/2 + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 + dF
LA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′ff
TA uLW (h) + dL − v + 2dF uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2
LA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I2LW
hQatf
TA uLW (h) + dL − p + dF uR1 (h) + p + 3dF /2 uR2 (h)
LA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′ft
TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 − r + dF
LA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I3LW
hQatx
TA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + p + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′fx TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2 + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I4LW
hQaft
TA uLW (h) + dL − p + dF /2 uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + p + 3dF /2
LA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′tf
TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + v2
LA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I5LW
hQaff
TA uLW (h) + dL − p + 2r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′tt
TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p + 2r uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 − r + dF
LA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
RA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I6LW
hQafx
TA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′tx TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I7LW
hQaxt
TA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′xf TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) + v1 + dF uR2 (h) + v2
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I8LW
hQaxf
TA uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′xt TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + v1 + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 − r + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
I9LW
hQaxx
TA uLW (h) + dL − p − e uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
hQa′xx TA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e uR1 (h) + v1 + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + dF
XA uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
- h B uLW (h) - -
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Table 3. Continuation of Table.2: The recursive definition of utility function: h denotes
a history in Γ k2 the to represent any history at which LW moves to determine raise a
query or abort the protocol “-” means an unreachable history.
Info Set
of LW
Histories
of LW
Actions
of LW
Utility of LW Utility of R1 Utility of R2
I1LW
hQatt
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 + dF
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′ff
TA′ uLW (h) + dL + 2dF uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I2LW
hQatf
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p + dF /2 uR1 (h) + v1 + p + 3dF /2 uR2 (h) + v2
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′ft
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I3LW
hQatx
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + v1 + p + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′fx TA
′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I4LW
hQaft
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p + dF /2 uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2 + p + 3dF /2
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′tf
TA′ uLW (h) + p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) + dL + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h)
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I5LW
hQaff
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p + 2r uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 − r + dF
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′tt
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − p + 2r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
RA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r - -
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I6LW
hQafx
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + v1 + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′tx TA
′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I7LW
hQaxt
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + v1 + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′xf TA
′ uLW (h) + dL − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h)
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e - -
I8LW
hQaxf
TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + v1 + dF uR2 (h) + v2 + p/2 − r + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e - -
hQa′xt TA
′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
XA′ uLW (h) + dL − e - -
I9LW
hQaxx TA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2
hQaxx XA′ uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e uR1 (h) + v1 uR2 (h) + v2
hQa′xx TA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
hQa′xx XA′ uLW (h) + dL − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
- h B uLW (h) - -
40 Y. Lu et al.
Table 4. Continuation of Table.2: The recursive definition of utility function: h denotes
a history in Γ k2 the to represent any history at which LW moves to determine raise a
query or abort the protocol “-” means an unreachable history.
Info Set
of LW
Histories
of LW
Actions
of LW
Utility of LW Utility of R1 Utility of R2
I1LW
hQatt
TO uLW (h) − c − p uR1 (h) + p/2 + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 + dF
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e +  - -
hQa′ff
TO uLW (h) − c + 2dF uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
LO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e +  - -
I2LW
hQatf
TO uLW (h) − c − p + dF /2 uR1 (h) + p + 3dF /2 uR2 (h)
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′ft
TO uLW (h) − c − p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I3LW
hQatx
TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + p + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′fx TO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I4LW
hQaft
TO uLW (h) − c − p + dF /2 uR1 (h) uR2 (h) + p + 3dF /2
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′tf
TO uLW (h) − c + p/2 + r + dF uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h)
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I5LW
hQaff
TO uLW (h) − c − p + 2r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′tt
TO uLW (h) − c − p + 2r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
LO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
RO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r - -
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I6LW
hQafx
TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′tx TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + p/2 − r + dF uR2 (h) + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I7LW
hQaxt
TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′xf TO uLW (h) − c − p/2 − e/2 + dF /2 uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h)
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
I8LW
hQaxf
TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − p − e - -
hQa′xt TO uLW (h) − c − p − e/2 + r uR1 (h) + dF uR2 (h) + p/2 − r + dF
XO uLW (h) − c − e - -
I9LW
hQaxx TO uLW (h) − c − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
hQaxx XO uLW (h) − c − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
hQa′xx TO uLW (h) − c − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
hQa′xx XO uLW (h) − c − p − e uR1 (h) uR2 (h)
- h B uLW (h) - -
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Deferred proof for Theorem 1:
Proof. At the last query in the game Γ k2 , the client will raise the query (namely
act Q), conditioned on dL > (p+e). Additionally from Lemma 2, it immediately
proves the Theorem 1 due to backward reduction.
E.2 Proof for theorem 2
Lemma 3. If the client raises a query in the game Γ k1 , the sequentially rational
strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will not include X
(i.e., the light client will always take T to report the contract the whatever it
receives from the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. No matter at any history of any information set, taking an action includ-
ing X is dominated by replacing the character by T , which is clear from the
utility function.
Lemma 4. At the last query (history h) in the game Γ k1 , if the client raises the
last query (i.e. reaching the history hQ), the game terminates in hQ(atTA|a′tTA′),
conditioned on dF + p− r > vi, r > vi.
Proof. Let the history h denote the beginning of the last query. If the client raises
the query, the game reaches hQ. Due to Lemma 5, it can be seen that the only
reachable histories from h must have the prefix of: hQ(a|a′)(t|f |x)T (A|A′|O).
Then it is immediate to see t is dominating from the utility function. This
completes the lemma.
Deferred proof for Theorem 1:
Proof. From Lemma 4, acting Q is strictly dominates B due to the utility func-
tion, at least in the last query. So the last query would include no deviation at
all. It immediately allows us prove the Theorem 2 due to backward reduction
from Lemma 4.
E.3 Proof for theorem 3
Lemma 5. If the client raises a query in the augmented game Gk1 , the sequen-
tially rational strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will
not include X (i.e., the light client will always take T to report the contract the
whatever it receives from the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. No matter how the relay and the public full node act, taking an action
including X is dominated by replacing the character by T in the augmented
game Gk1 .
Lemma 6. At the last query (history h) in the game Gk1 , if the client raises the
last query (i.e. reaching the history h(m|x)Q), the relay node would not deviate
off t with non-negligible probability, conditioned on dF > vi.
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Proof. Let the history h denote any history where is the turn of the light
client to choose from {Q,B}. If the client raises the query due to Lemma 5,
it can be seen that the only reachable histories from h must have the prefix of:
h(m|x)Q(a|a′)(t|f |x)T (A|A′|O). Given such fact, the relay would not deviate off
t with non-negligible probability: (i) deviate to play x is strictly dominated; (ii)
deviate to play f with negligible probability will consistently cause the public
full node acts m. This completes the lemma.
Deferred proof for Theorem 3:
Proof. From Lemma 6, acting Q is strictly dominates B due to the utility func-
tion, at least in the last query. Thus we can argue due to backward reduction
from the last query to the first query. It immediately completes the proof for
Theorem 3.
F Other Pertinent Work
Here we thoroughly review the insufficiencies of relevant work.8
Lightweight protocols for blockchains. The SPV client is the first light-
client protocol for Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains, proposed as early as Bit-
coin [63]. The main weakness of SPV client is that the block headers to download,
verify and store increase linearly with the growth of the chain, which nowadays
is > 2 GB in Ethereum. To realize super-light client for PoW, the ideas of Proofs
of PoW and FlyClient [15] were proposed, so the light client can store only the
genesis block to verify the existence of a blockchain record at a sub-linear cost,
once connecting at least one honest full node.
Though the existence of superlight protocols for PoW chains, all these schemes
cannot be applied for other types of consensuses such as the proof-of-stake (PoS)
[37,48,21]. A recent study on PoS sidechains [31] (and a few relevant industry
proposals [59,54]) presented the idea of “certificates” to cheaply convince some
always on-line clients on the incremental growth of the PoS chains; however,
their obvious limitation not only corresponds linear cost for the frequently off-
line clients, but also renders serious vulnerability for the clients re-spawning from
a “deep-sleep”, because the inherent costless simulation makes the deep sleepers
cannot distinguish a forged chain from the correct main chain [32,21].
Few fast-bootstrap protocols such as [56] and [9] exist for PoS chains, but they
are concretely designed for Algorand [37] and Ouroboros Praos [22] respectively,
let alone they are only suitable to boot full nodes and still incur substantial
costs that are not affordable by resource-starved clients. Different from Vault
[56] and Ouroboros Genesis [9], another PoS protocol Snow White [21] makes
a heavyweight assumption that a permissioned list of full nodes with honest-
majority can be identified, such that “social consensus” of these full nodes can
8 Remark that there are also many studies [35,58] focus on protecting the privacy of
lightweight blockchain client. However, we are emphasizing the basic functionality
of the light client instead of such the advanced property.
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be leveraged to allow deep sleepers to efficiently re-spawn. In contrast to [21],
our design is based on a different assumption, rationality, which is less heavy
and more realistic in many real-world scenarios from our point of view.
Vitalik Buterin [17] proposed to avoid forks in PoS chains by incentives: a
selected committee member will be punished, if she proposes two different blocks
in one epoch. In this way, the light client was claimed to be supported, as the light
who receives a fake block different from the correct one can send the malicious
block back to the blockchain network to punish the creator of the cheating block.
However, as the committees rotate periodically, it is unclear whether the protocol
still works if the light client is querying about some “ancient” blocks generated
before the relay node becomes a committee. A recent work [41] noticed the lack
of incentives due to cryptographic treatments, and proposed to use the smart
contract to incorporate incentives, but it relies on the existing lightweight-client
protocols as underlying primitives, and cannot function independently.
Another line of studies propose the concept of stateless client [18,14,59]. Es-
sentially, a stateless client can validate new blocks without storing the aggregated
states of the ledger (e.g., the UTXOs in Bitcoin [63] or the so-called states in
Ethereum [75,16]), such that the stateless client can incrementally update its
local blockchain replica cheaply. Though those studies can reduce the burden
of (always on-line) full nodes, they currently cannot help the frequently off-line
light clients to read arbitrarily ancient records of the blockchain.
Outsourced computations. Reading from the blockchain can be viewed as
a special computation over the ledger, which could be supported by the gen-
eral techniques of outsourcing computations. But the general techniques do not
perform well.
Verifiable computation allows a prover to convince a verifier that an output is
obtained through correctly computing a function [34]. Recent constructive devel-
opment of generic verifiable computations such as SNARKs [12] enables efficient
verifications (for general NP-statements) with considerable cost of proving. Usu-
ally, for some heavy statements such as proving the PoWs/PoSs of a blockchain,
the generic verifiable computation tools are infeasible in practice [15,59].
To reduce the high cost of generality, Coda [59] proposed to use the idea
of incremental proofs to allow (an always on-line) stateless client to validate
blocks cheaply, but it is still unclear how to use the same idea to convince the
(frequently off-line) clients without prohibitive proving cost. Some other studies
[45,6] focus on allowing the resource-constrained clients to efficiently verifying
the computations taking the blockchain as input, but they require the clients
already have the valid chain headers, and did not tackle the major problem of
light clients, i.e., how to get the correct chain of headers.
Attestation via trusted hardwares has attracted many attentions recently
[19,79], and it becomes enticing to employ the trusted hardwares towards the
practical light-client scheme [58]. However, recent Foreshadow attacks [74] put
SGX’s attestation keys in danger of leakage, and potentially allow an adversary
to forge attestations, which might fully break the remote attestation of SGX and
subsequently challenge the fundamental assumption of trusted hardwares.
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Outsourced computation via incentive games were discussed before [67,53].
Some recent studies even consider the blockchain to facilitate games for out-
sourced computations [24,71]. All the studies assume an implicit game mediator
(e.g. the blockchain) who can speak/listen to all involving parties, including the
requester, the workers and a trusted third-party (TTP). However, in our set-
ting, we have to resolve a special issue that there is neither TTP nor mediator,
since the blockchain, as a potential candidate, can neither speak to the light nor
validate some special blockchain readings.
